Regulation and technical standards: what is where
The regulation itself sets out the principles. The details are in regulatory and implementing technical standards drafted by the European Supervisory Authorities and adopted by the European Commission. Anyone implementing DORA therefore always works with several texts in parallel. The most important cover the ICT risk management framework and its simplified version, the classification of incidents and cyber threats, the content, formats and deadlines of incident reports, threat-led penetration testing, the templates for the register of information, the policy on ICT services supporting critical or important functions, and subcontracting.
In practice this means: the regulation says you must classify an incident. Only the standard names the criteria, such as clients affected, duration, geographical spread, data losses and economic impact, and defines when an incident counts as major. The same applies to the register: which fields it has and how it is structured follows from the templates in the implementing standard.
In addition there are guidelines and Q&As from the European Supervisory Authorities as well as BaFin publications, for example on reporting channels and submission windows. These texts change more often than the regulation. In Sightadel, every control is linked to the article it relates to. Where a standard specifies details, the control names the expected evidence. If in doubt, check the authoritative version with the supervisor.
The register of information in practice
The register is the part of DORA that most entities underestimated. It does not simply require a list of contracts, but a structured register: which ICT service the entity obtains from whom, under which contract, for which function, whether that function is critical or important, where data is processed, how easily the service provider could be replaced, and which subcontractors sit behind it in the chain. The register is kept at the level of the individual entity and, for groups, on a consolidated basis.
BaFin requests the register once a year as at a reference date. Submission takes place via its reporting and publishing platform within a set time window. For the 2026 submission, this window was in March. A register only counts as submitted once it passes the validation rules of the European Supervisory Authorities. Missing service provider identifiers or contradictory information on functions lead to rejections. The European Supervisory Authorities also use the registers to designate critical ICT third-party service providers for direct EU oversight.
The real work is not in filling it in, but in gathering the information. Details are scattered across contracts, procurement, IT and the business units. If you only update the register for the reference date, you start your search from scratch every year. Sightadel therefore starts with the Vendors module: every service provider is maintained with contract, supported functions, criticality, locations and evidence as soon as it is engaged. New contracts, terminations and changed subcontractors are recorded there in everyday work, not in spring.
Costs and internal effort
DORA mainly costs the time of people who are already fully stretched: information security, business continuity management, procurement, legal, internal audit and management. The Sightadel licence for DORA is charged monthly per edition, with discounts for multiple frameworks and advance payment. You can find all prices and a calculator on our pricing page.
External costs arise elsewhere and are invoiced by the respective providers themselves. In our experience, three items drive them most. First, contract amendments with service providers, often with legal support. Second, the testing programme, especially if you are identified for TLPT: a threat-led test with threat analysis, red team and closure work is a project lasting months. Third, collecting data for the register when contract records are incomplete.
Where you can save: if you run an ISMS under ISO 27001, you do not have to reinvent risk management, access control, backup and incident handling. In Sightadel, existing evidence is attached to both frameworks. We deliberately do not give a figure for the overlap, because it depends on the scope. Consulting for the difficult parts, such as determining critical or important functions, can be booked as a package in the app when needed.
Management responsibility, sanctions and liability
DORA explicitly places responsibility for ICT risk in the hands of the management body. It defines and approves the framework, sets the roles, determines the risk appetite for ICT risk, approves the policies on business continuity and third parties, provides the budget and undergoes regular training. The work can be delegated, the responsibility cannot. Audits therefore ask what management has decided, how it is kept informed and which training its members can prove they have completed.
In Germany, BaFin penalises breaches under national supervisory law, which was amended to implement DORA's sanction requirements. Possible measures include orders, fines and, for serious shortcomings, further supervisory action. Critical ICT third-party service providers are subject to direct oversight by a European lead overseer, which issues recommendations and can impose periodic penalty payments calculated on the basis of average daily worldwide turnover.
Besides supervision, the civil law side matters. An unmanaged service provider failure, a late report or an untested backup can raise questions of damages towards clients and of liability towards management. How this is to be assessed in an individual case is something to clarify with your legal adviser. Sightadel does not provide legal advice, but ensures that resolutions, training and decisions are documented with a date and an owner.
What documentation the supervisor expects
The regulation does not give an exhaustive list, but a clear core follows from the regulation and the standards. It includes the documented ICT risk management framework together with the digital operational resilience strategy, policies on information security, access and change management and vulnerability management, an ICT business continuity policy with response and recovery plans, backup policies with evidence of tested restoration, an incident management process with classification criteria and an incident register, the testing programme with results, the strategy on ICT third-party risk, the register of information and exit strategies for service providers supporting critical or important functions.
The framework must be reviewed at least once a year, and also after major incidents and after findings from tests or audits. A report is prepared on this review, which the supervisor can request. Just as important is evidence that the documents are actually lived: approvals, training records, records of restore tests, remediated findings from tests and internal audit.
In Sightadel, each of these documents is assigned to a control, with version, approval and expiry date. If a piece of evidence expires, such as an annual restore test, it appears on the dashboard as an open item. That way the picture is complete not only on the audit date.
Planning the testing programme and TLPT properly
Every financial entity that does not fall under the simplified framework needs a risk-based digital operational resilience testing programme. Depending on the environment, this includes vulnerability assessments and scans, source code reviews, scenario-based tests, compatibility and performance tests, end-to-end tests and penetration tests. Systems supporting critical or important functions are tested appropriately at least once a year. Testers must be independent, whether internal or external.
Threat-led penetration testing, TLPT for short, only applies to entities identified for it by the supervisor and then usually takes place every three years. It follows its own technical standard, which is based on the European TIBER framework. A TLPT runs on live production systems and comprises a threat analysis, a covert attack by a red team and a joint closure phase. The supervisor accompanies the test and confirms at the end that it has been carried out.
The time after the test is often underestimated. Findings must be assessed, prioritised and remediated within deadlines, and the supervisor wants to see the progress. In Sightadel, every finding becomes an issue with an owner and a due date. The test itself is carried out by specialist testers; Sightadel records planning, results and remediation.
Interplay with NIS2, ISO 27001 and previous BaFin requirements
For financial entities, DORA is the more specific law in relation to NIS2. They meet their cybersecurity obligations through DORA, not twice. In groups with companies outside the financial sector, both regimes can apply side by side. It then pays to maintain measures and evidence only once and map them to both.
For entities within the scope of DORA, BaFin's previous IT circulars for banks, insurers, investment management companies and payment institutions have been superseded by the regulation. BaFin has published guidance on how existing requirements, for example on outsourcing management outside ICT, relate to DORA. Which parts continue to apply in your organisation should be clarified before the gap analysis.
ISO 27001 is not mandatory, but a proven framework. A certificate shows that a management system is running which supports DORA to a large extent. What DORA additionally requires is mainly the register, reporting deadlines, contract content and the testing programme. Attestations such as BSI C5 or SOC 2 from your service providers are valuable evidence when assessing them, but do not replace your own risk assessment.