What the standard covers and what it does not
ISO 27090 concentrates on threats that only or mainly affect AI systems. It maps them to the life cycle, describes possible consequences and shows ways to detect and mitigate attacks. ISO's description of the standard explicitly mentions poisoning of training data and theft of a model through queries that look like normal use. It also stresses the consequences in safety-critical applications.
The standard does not redefine general information security. Access control, encryption, logging, vulnerability management and contingency planning remain the domain of ISO 27001 and 27002. ISO 27090 starts where these controls are not enough for AI, for example when an attacker changes the behaviour of a model through data or inputs without taking over a server.
Fairness, transparency or the impact on affected people are not its subject either. For those there is ISO 42001 with risk assessment and impact assessment for AI, and the EU AI Act. For privacy in AI, ISO is developing the sister standard ISO 27091. Anyone introducing the standard should know this boundary so that responsibilities are not assigned twice or not at all.
Costs and internal effort
You buy the standard itself from ISO or a national standards body. You do not need a certification body, because there is no certificate. The Sightadel licence for ISO 27090: Price on request. If you already run ISO 27001 or ISO 42001 in Sightadel, you keep using the risk register, controls and evidence.
The biggest item is the time of specialists. A threat analysis for AI systems cannot be done by the information security team alone. You need people who know the models, data and interfaces: development, data owners, operations and, for purchased services, procurement. Expect several working sessions per critical AI system.
Implementing technical controls can be expensive, for example additional checks on training data, limits on queries or tests with deliberately crafted inputs. It pays to proceed by criticality and start with the systems where an attack would do the most damage. Where experience is lacking, you can add consulting as a package in the app.
Relationship to the EU AI Act
In Art. 15, the EU AI Act requires high-risk AI systems to achieve an appropriate level of accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity throughout their life cycle. The attacks named include data poisoning, model poisoning, crafted inputs for model evasion, confidentiality attacks and model flaws. This largely matches the topics of ISO 27090.
Even so, the standard is not proof of conformity. It is not a harmonised standard referenced in the Official Journal of the EU and therefore does not create a presumption that Art. 15 is met. CEN-CENELEC is drafting a separate European standard on the cybersecurity of AI systems under the regulation, which so far exists as a draft. Following the 2026 postponement, the obligations for high-risk systems apply from December 2027 for stand-alone systems and from August 2028 for AI in regulated products.
Whether your system counts as a high-risk system and which obligations follow from that is something you check separately, ideally with your legal advisers. Sightadel does not provide legal advice on this. For the legal obligations, Sightadel has a separate framework for the EU AI Act, which you manage with the same evidence.
Building it into the ISMS and AI management system
The least effort arises when you use ISO 27090 as a source of knowledge for existing processes. In the risk assessment under ISO 27001, you add the threats from the standard for each AI system. The selected controls go into the treatment plan and, where they go beyond Annex A, into the Statement of Applicability as additional controls.
If you run ISO 42001, the AI inventory already gives you the list of systems, their purposes and owners. The AI risk assessment there asks about risks to the organisation and to affected people. ISO 27090 helps you fill the part on targeted attacks properly, rather than ticking it off with general statements on IT security.
In Sightadel, threats, controls and evidence are attached to the AI system concerned. You link the same control, for example a check on the origin of training data, to ISO 27001, ISO 42001 and the EU AI Act. That way you maintain it once and see in every framework where it counts. In the internal audit you then check whether the controls for AI systems work as planned.
Putting typical attacks into context
In data poisoning, an attacker smuggles manipulated data into training so that the model later reacts wrongly or as the attacker wants. This matters above all if you train or fine-tune models yourself, for example with data from the internet, from customers or from service providers. Protection comes from known sources, checks before training and clear rights over who may change data.
In model theft, an attacker sends many queries and uses the answers to build a model that behaves similarly. This mainly affects providers whose model can be reached through an interface. Unusual query patterns and limits per user are obvious starting points here. If you only buy in AI, this attack usually concerns you less.
Systems with language models add prompt injection: instructions hidden in inputs, emails or documents make the system bypass rules or disclose data. This also affects companies that only use AI through a provider. Which of these attacks the standard describes in detail can be found in the text of the standard. Sightadel does not contain the wording.
Documentation and ongoing operation
As there is no certificate, nobody prescribes a particular set of documentation. Useful, and helpful in ISO 27001 or ISO 42001 audits, are a list of AI systems with the parts that need protecting, the threat analysis per system, the selected controls with rationale, and evidence that they are implemented and effective. Record who carried out which assessment and when.
AI systems change faster than many other systems. A new model at the provider, a new data set or a new interface can change the assessment. Define which changes trigger a new analysis and make the check a fixed step in procurement and release. After an incident or when a new attack becomes known, review the systems concerned outside the regular cycle.
In Sightadel, reassessments, vendor reviews, internal audit and management review run as recurring cycles with dates. In the Trust Center you show customers how you secure AI systems without putting together new documents for every request.